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The priority of secured credit has repeatedly and famously been attacked for allowing the
exploitation of certain types of unsecured creditor. It has also been blamed for creating
inefficiencies. This paper examines these arguments specifically as applied to this
jurisdiction, and using both theoretical analysis and recent empirical data, suggests none of
them can be sustained. It is argued that security is unlikely to lead to the exploitation of
involuntary, ‘uninformed’, or ‘unsophisticated’ creditors, since the perverse incentives it
allegedly creates for the debtor’s management are likely to be outweighed by the managers’
liquidation-related costs. It is then pointed out that both exploitation-based and inefficiencybased attack on the priority of secured credit depend on the assumption that secured credit is
generally cheaper than unsecured credit, and further, that this is why debtors prefer to borrow
on a secured rather than unsecured basis. Recent evidence from this jurisdiction is used to
challenge this assumption. This has dramatic implications for the attacks on security, which
are discussed. The paper concludes with the demonstration that secured credit, by inducing
creditors to lend when they would not do so without being offered priority, is mutually valueenhancing for all types of creditor, including unsecured ones.
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1. Introduction
Three characteristics can be said to distinguish the secured from the unsecured creditor.1 The
secured creditor obtains priority, the right to have the collateral applied to the satisfaction of
his debts in a particular order vis-à-vis other creditors. The collateral is also encumbered, in
that the debtor loses the right to convey to third parties rights inconsistent with those of the
secured creditor. Finally, security provides a remedy in enforcing the secured debt which is
quicker and cheaper, hence superior, compared to that afforded to unsecured creditors. It is
especially when the debtor is on the brink of or actually in insolvency that the existence of
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security assumes the greatest significance. From the perspective of English (corporate)
insolvency law, there is an alternative approach (though a closely linked one) to
distinguishing secured from unsecured credit. Secured creditors of a debtor subject to that
part of the law are treated differently from its unsecured creditors in two ways. First, the
secured creditor stands at the head of the queue for recoupment, from the proceeds of sale of
the collateral, of what it is owed. It has priority over other creditors. And second, unsecured
creditors lose their ability independently to pursue their claims, and a special collective
insolvency regime takes over.2 However, secured claimants have immunity from having to
participate in this regime, and might for example seize and sell the collateral for the
satisfaction of their debt.3 Nor is this indulgence towards security holders a relic of the past.
A recent study found that secured creditors are treated more favourably in this jurisdiction
than in any of the other fourteen OECD countries studied by the authors.4
The advantages accorded to the secured creditor have not gone unnoticed. There has
always been some feeling -- at least among some academic commentators -- that the balance
is tilted too far in favour of those holding security.5 The Report of the Insolvency Law
Review Committee proposed certain restrictions on the secured creditors’ ability to enforce
their security.6 Famously, it suggested that 10% of the value of the assets subject to a floating
charge be set aside in a company’s insolvency for distribution to unsecured creditors.7 The
ability of secured creditors to appoint a receiver to manage assets subject to their security
was also considered, and the Committee proposed a suspension of the security holder’s right
to enforce that security for twelve months, should a receiver or administrator be appointed.8
Neither of these proposals was reflected in the Insolvency Act 1985, enacted in response to
the Cork Report. It is the case, however, that preferential creditors rank ahead of the floating
charge holder.9
In the United States, the late 1970s saw the emergence of a debate on the desirability
of the priority scheme enshrined in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and how it
should be affected by the onset of the debtor’s bankruptcy. The ranks of those contributing to
the debate have continued to expand, and the literature is now voluminous.10 Commentators
in this jurisdiction have taken note, and distinguished company and insolvency law scholars
have turned their attention to examining the need, role and justifications for secured credit.11
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A perusal of most recent scholarship here suggests the pendulum has swung from one
extreme to the other. In a regime marked by such a tolerant attitude towards the taking of
security and its enforcement, security in its present form is now freely condemned as unfair
and inefficient. Various proposals to reign in the almighty secured creditor are receiving
attention.12
That a lot of ink has been spilt on arguing about the proper place of security should
be obvious. Numerous useful summaries of the debate so far and of the state of play at
present are available.13 Yet another summary would add little of value. So this paper assumes
some familiarity with the debate, focuses on the position of corporate debtors in this
jurisdiction, and argues that the academic pendulum has swung too far. Recall the
insolvency-centred classification of the rights of secured claimants given above. This paper
addresses itself mainly to issues arising out of the priority of secured claims. It identifies the
main lines of attack on the institution of secured credit, and attempts a defence based on
empirical and theoretical (and to a lesser extent, doctrinal) grounds.
Some critics of security have argued that it exists mainly to take value away from
certain types of unsecured creditor. In particular, debate has centred on the position of
various sorts of ‘involuntary’ creditors. It has also been argued that some ‘unsophisticated’
creditors are unable to price their loans properly, which allows them to be exploited, through
the use of security, by coalitions of debtors and better-informed creditors. Related but distinct
are those attacks on the priority of secured credit based not on the exploitation that it
allegedly makes possible, but the inefficiency that it supposedly creates. These are also
founded on identifying various types of ‘non-adjusting’ creditor – involuntary, small-claim
holders, tax authorities, those who lend before secured credit is issued, etc. Critics argue that
secured credit will sometimes be issued, not because it is socially value-maximising, but
simply because it allows debtors and some creditors to drain away bankruptcy value from
non-adjusting creditors. This leads to various types of inefficiency.
This paper conceive of the attack on the priority of secured credit as a search for
someone to save. Critics of security would like to point to a group of creditors who are either
harmed by the existence of security, or whose own existence allows security to wreak havoc
with social efficiency to the detriment of all. If such a group could be identified, the critics
would then be justified in recommending curtailment of (some of) the priority rights of those
who offer and accept security. This paper examines the claims that such a group has been
found, and finds reason to reject them all. Instead, it reaches the conclusion that the existence
of the priority of secured credit is mutually value-enhancing for all those interested in the
company’s undertaking.

2. Tort creditors and the Exploitation Hypothesis
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Here is the basic insight on which the attacks on the priority of secured credit are based.14
Consider the world of Debtor, who wishes to borrow from various Creditors. Creditors all
start off being equal in every respect (including their share of the Debtor’s estate if the latter
becomes insolvent). In this world, all Creditors are aware of Debtor’s dealings with all other
Creditors, and each writes their loan contract with Debtor on the basis of, and relying on, this
information. Now if one Creditor (called Bank) demands a security interest and the Debtor
complies, all remaining Creditors realise they would have less distributed to them, should
Debtor fail (what would have been available for distribution pari passu will first go towards
satisfying Bank’s debt). But other Creditors are not harmed. They simply raise the interest
rates they charge Debtor to compensate for the loss of insolvency value. It follows that, at its
worst in this imagined world, security is absolutely harmless.
The assumptions just made are of course unrealistic, and this is what critics of
security seize on. That not all creditors would be perfectly informed of their debtor’s
behaviour, and separately, that not all of them would be able to modify their dealings with the
debtor to compensate for the loss in insolvency value, is the basis for almost all the attacks on
secured credit. In the real world, critics argue, secured credit can be used to siphon away
insolvency value from certain types of unsecured creditor, to the debtor and secured
creditors. The argument comes in two varieties, which will be called the Exploitation and the
Inefficiency Hypotheses. This Section of this paper, and the next, deal with the first of these.
In answering the question why parties sometimes agree to security arrangements, Lynn
LoPucki has presented a ‘promising malignant explanation[] for the existence of secured
debt’.15 He argues that ‘the deceptive nature of security enables secured creditors and debtors
to extract a subsidy from those who involuntarily become unsecured creditors.’16 A similar
subsidy is said to be extracted from ‘relatively uninformed unsecured creditors who
predictably miscalculate their likelihoods of recovery.’17 ‘The ability to victimize [such]
creditors’, claims LoPucki, ‘may in significant part explain why secured credit is such a
widespread phenomenon.’18

A. Secured Credit and Large Firms
It would be useful to begin with an examination of the facts on which these arguments are
based, and of their assumptions. It is important also to keep in mind these arguments were
originally made in the US context. The same concerns have recently been voiced in this
jurisdiction, notably by Finch in an exhaustive and helpful recent article.19 So we might wish
to consider whether the differences between the two legal systems have an impact on the
transferability of the arguments.
Let us start by identifying the categories of creditor supposedly ‘exploited’ through
the use of security. LoPucki mentions eight such categories, whom he classifies as
‘involuntary’ or ‘reluctant’.20 Without wishing to construct watertight categories, perhaps
five could be regarded as ‘tort’ creditors, widely construed. These include product liability
claimants, victims of business torts (‘ranging from negligence to intentional interference with
14
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contractual relations’), victims of antitrust violations, unfair competition, patent, trademark
and copyright infringement, environmental agencies which perform clean-ups, and creditors
who acquire that status because of the debtor’s fraud. The remaining categories consist of tax
authorities and certain other government agencies, and utility companies. These are all to be
considered ‘involuntary’, argues LoPucki, since they are ‘not in the business of extending
credit and [do] not seek credit relationships.’21
LoPucki claims that ‘Any debtor who either has, or expects in the future to have,
involuntary unsecured creditors will find economic advantage in “selling” secured status to
its voluntary creditors.’22 He explains that to the extent that the debtor’s capital structure
consists of equity, its shareholders are exposed to liability. Claims against the firm by
involuntary creditors would be met out of the firm’s assets. This reduces the firm’s value and
therefore directly hurts shareholders, the only other claimants to those assets. The existence
of debt in the firm’s capital structure reduces shareholders’ ‘real exposure’ to that liability.
‘Real exposure’ is that part of its tort liability that the debtor is forced to pay, rather than
being able to defeat through declaring bankruptcy. So once debt has been issued, some of the
firm’s value comes from creditors, and some of the involuntary claims would be met from
that value. This line of reasoning indicates that the shareholders’ real exposure to tort
liability is ‘almost eliminated’ once all of the tortfeasor’s assets, including its future stream
of income, have been fully encumbered. Should involuntary claims now arise, and should
shareholders wish the firm to avoid having to repay them, the firm can declare insolvency and
shareholders can walk away without further liability to anyone.23
The simple example used by LoPucki illustrates nicely how the argument is supposed
to work.24 D has assets of $100 and owes C a debt of $100. D’s activities then tortiously
cause T an injury of $100, without thereby gaining D anything in return. D is subsequently
liquidated with $100 of assets and $200 of debt. If C is unsecured, both it and T will receive
$50 each. If C is secured, it receives everything, and T gets nothing. So D obviously has an
incentive before the liquidation (for businesses expected to inflict such injuries, perhaps well
before it) to offer C security. This is because C in return will offer a decrease in its interest
charges to reflect the reduced risk of being left with less than full payment in D’s insolvency.
Tort victim T, being an involuntary creditor, cannot of course raise its interest rates to
compensate. So D pockets the difference. This subsidy, caused by the ‘externalization of tort
risk’ onto T, creates incentives for firms to undertake more risk-laden projects.25 This will
happen not because those projects are socially efficient, but simply because some of their
costs are shifted onto involuntary third parties while the benefits go only to the tortfeasor’s
shareholders.
It seems clear the ‘involuntary’ creditors who really concern LoPucki are tort
victims.26 The example reproduced above, and the supporting literature he refers to,27 as well
as most of his discussion, all are concerned overwhelmingly with tort liability. Further, the
main thrust of his argument is that security allows additional ‘risk’ (meaning here the
21
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potential to cause tortious harm) to be created and externalised. This would generally
describe the undertaking of riskier projects which would not otherwise have been undertaken,
or projects which -- in the absence of secured creditors’ priority over ‘involuntary’ ones -would have been executed in a less risky way, i.e. by employing more (costly) precautions.
‘Involuntary’ liabilities which arise regardless of the riskiness of the company’s activities,
e.g. utility bills and taxes, would not in most cases be covered by this line of argument. For
this reason, the treatment here of the Exploitation Hypothesis focuses on tort creditors
(construed broadly, as above).28
How, then, should LoPucki’s argument be evaluated? The charge is of course a
serious one: that some (perhaps most) debtors who issue security do so in order to profit from
inflicting uncompensated harm on others. To put into context the magnitude of this assertion,
in the US, domestic borrowers alone are estimated to have about two trillion dollars of
secured debt.29 Finch, who (as mentioned) has deployed LoPucki’s argument in relation to
secured credit in England and regards it as part of ‘the core objection to the provision of
security’,30 asserts that ‘Security taking is the norm in relation to most borrowings’.31 So
English debtors too must be ‘victimizing’ tort creditors on a massive scale.32 Keeping in mind
the gravity of this objection to security, we should perhaps begin by asking what evidence is
presented in its support.
Citing US research which is supposed to have found twenty-three percent of the
unsecured debt of consumer bankrupts to be owed to ‘reluctant’ creditors,33 LoPucki
‘speculate[s] that money owed to reluctant creditors constitutes an even larger portion of the
debt of financially distressed companies.’34 In support, he states that in a study of ‘the 43
largest reorganizations of the 1980s’ (hereafter, the LoPucki-Whitford study), it was found
that for two of the companies studied, more than two-thirds of the unsecured debt was
‘involuntary’. These were Johns-Manville Corporation, ‘with well in excess of $2 billion in
asbestos personal injury claims alone’, and Smith International, which had ‘a $205 million
judgment against it for patent infringement.’35 Further, in ‘at least 7 more of [the] 43
companies, management had fraudulently concealed the financial problems of the company
in the period before bankruptcy, casting doubt on whether any of their unsecured creditors
should be considered to have consented to the status they were given’. So overall and
importantly, ‘in nearly a third of the cases [] studied, substantial portions of the unsecured
debt were held by creditors who had not meaningfully agreed to their status as such.’36
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It would not be unfair to say this demonstration that corporate debtors engaged in
formal bankruptcy proceedings have substantial ‘involuntary’ unsecured liabilities has
entered the mythology of those supporting restrictions on secured credit. Apart from LoPucki
himself, it is cited by Bebchuk and Fried (hereafter, ‘Bebchuk-Fried’) as part of their attack
on security.37 Finch cites it no less than five times.38 Even those who are generally supportive
of the priority of secured credit have been known to refer to it as indicating the possible
malignant effects of security.39 No other evidence seems to be available to show that
(especially in this jurisdiction) there are significant tort claims against companies in financial
distress. As it is, the LoPucki-Whitford study has been used to back up all manner of
proposals to cut down on the rights of secured creditors on both sides of the Atlantic.40 And
in particular, it has widely been taken as proof that the ability of debtors to transfer value
from ‘involuntary’ to secured creditors is in fact encouraging excessive amounts of corporate
risk-taking and an unacceptable degree of uncompensated harm (including tortious harm).
Things, however, are not as they seem. The LoPucki-Whitford study, far from
providing any support for the Exploitation Hypothesis, in fact goes some way towards
disproving it. Let us begin by noting that the study focused on the ‘largest reorganizations of
the 1980s’.41 It follows that each of the 43 companies studied had extensive business
interests, and correspondingly, the capacity to incur substantial ‘involuntary’ debts. Save in
the most exceptional circumstances, smaller companies simply would not have the ability
(say) to inflict ‘well in excess of $2 billion’ of personal injuries, or face realistic claims of
$205 million for patent infringement.42 The reader can be forgiven for thinking that to point
this out is to state what is blatantly obvious. But here lies the problem for LoPucki’s thesis. It
is universally acknowledged (even by critics of security) that the larger the company, the
more unlikely it is to issue secured debt.
Here is some of the evidence. Bebchuk-Fried themselves have stated that ‘In the
United States, large, publicly traded firms tend not to borrow on a secured basis’ and that
‘most commercial secured debt [] is issued by small- and medium-sized companies.’43 Ronald
Mann calls it ‘the most well-established aspect of [the] actual practice’ of lending that ‘the
strongest companies in our economy ordinarily do not secure their debts.’44 Steven Schwarcz
found in an analysis of fourteen investment grade public companies selected at random that
‘with extremely limited exceptions, only their non-recourse debt is secured.’ He concluded
that his research, though based on a small sample, ‘[did] suggest that investment grade
companies have little or no secured debt and little non-recourse debt.’45 This is strongly
supported by UK evidence. Ameziane Lasfer’s study of all the companies quoted on the
London Stock Exchange in the 1984-96 period (for which the relevant data was available in
37
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machine-readable form) showed that “secured debt is negatively related to firm size; small
firms hold more than three times [the amount of] secured debt than do larger companies. The
proportion of small companies’ debt that is secured is 61%, while that of the larger
companies is 17%.”46
Perhaps most interestingly, the LoPucki-Whitford study, on which most of the
Exploitation Hypothesis is based,47 itself found that ‘many of [the large companies studied]
issued little or no secured debt, even as they approached bankruptcy reorganization.’48 In
particular, Johns-Manville Corporation, which LoPucki had earlier mentioned as a
particularly good case in support of the Hypothesis because it had tort debts ‘well in excess
of $2 billion’ and insufficient insurance cover (of ‘only approximately $700 million’)49, also
‘had assets of $2.2 billion... and secured debt of approximately $40 million’.50 Smith
International, the only other company mentioned in the study as having a huge tort judgment
against it, actually paid 107.1 cents on the dollar to its unsecured creditors.51 Nor were these
cases exceptional. LoPucki blandly states that ‘Liquidations of [many of the] companies [in
the sample], even in bankruptcy, would yield substantial recoveries for unsecured
creditors.’52 He notes that:
In 28 of the 42 cases (67%) in which the debtor had bank debt, the primary banks
were wholly or substantially unsecured as bankruptcy approached. The banks
demanded security in at least 20 of the 28 cases (71%). The debtor refused to grant
security in 10 of the 20 cases (50%). In five of the 10 cases in which security was
granted shortly before bankruptcy, the bankruptcy was filed within the 90-day
preferences period and the grant was attacked. [In fact], it would appear that
companies are more likely to grant security when they avoid bankruptcy.53
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Further, of the seven companies whose unsecured creditors are regarded as ‘reluctant’ by
LoPucki because they might have made their loans on the basis of fraudulent information
provided by the debtor’s management, or the fraudulent concealment of information by it,
two were solvent.54 The creditors of three others could expect ‘substantial’ recoveries from
claims pursued by the debtor’s replacement management against its displaced one, or because
the latter settled the administrative charges brought against them by the SEC, or both.55 So
not only do we have no indication that these seven companies had issued substantial secured
debt, there were, in addition, significant recoveries by the unsecured creditors of five of them
in any case.
We should note the significance of this analysis. As mentioned, these are the very
companies whose conditions have repeatedly been used to support versions of the
Exploitation Hypothesis. These are also par excellence instances where (if the Hypothesis
held, so that the existence of security is to be explained by virtue of its ability to shift costs
onto ‘involuntary’ or ‘reluctant’ creditors) the managers and shareholders of these large firms
would have the greatest incentive to issue secured debt, since they would have massive tort
and other ‘involuntary’ liabilities to externalise. And yet secured borrowings were relatively
minuscule and there were actually sufficient assets available to meet much of those liabilities.
Secured debt was not then being used to externalise costs, nor were ‘involuntary’ creditors
(of whatever description) being ‘victimized’. It must therefore be reasonable to conclude that
the LoPucki-Whitford study provides no support at all for the Exploitation Hypothesis.
Further and importantly, we must note the differences between the US legal system,
where LoPucki-Whitford’s data originates, and that prevalent in this jurisdiction, where, as
noted above, it has recently been used as a basis for some arguments about secured credit.
For the LoPucki-Whitford study, in cases where some of the management of the debtor was
implicated in fraud, the authors themselves note that the US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11
‘reorganization procedure sometimes enables managers to escape liability for their
wrongdoing’, since the entrenchment of existing management brought about by that
procedure ‘gives even badly tainted managers leverage to negotiate their exit’. The managers
may be able to employ this leverage to demand ‘a release of liability’, or to ‘hinder[] or
delay[] actions by defrauded creditors and shareholders’.56 In this jurisdiction, by contrast,
the ‘existing management out’ response of formal insolvency procedures makes such activity
much more unlikely. To the extent that the knowledge that, should their firm enter a formal
proceeding, they would necessarily be displaced by an independent party, feeds into the
decision-making of managers ex ante, they have a stronger incentive (compared to their US
counterparts) not to engage in such activities in the first place. This weakens even further
whatever force LoPucki’s arguments might have in the US context.
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B. Strategic Liquidation and Small Firms
Suppose now that the defender of the Hypothesis were to concede that large companies do
not generally issue secured debt, so the Hypothesis does not apply to them. But it could still
apply to smaller firms, who might well have resorted to significant amounts of secured credit.
Their motivation might be to ‘sell’ the insolvency share of tort creditors to others by issuing
security. However, this suggestion seems to have its own problems. We should recall that the
Hypothesis turns on the ability of shareholders to reduce their ‘real exposure’ to tort liability
etc. It would be no good engaging in excessively risky activities and acquiring a reduction in
the price of credit by issuing security, only to have the savings paid out as compensation to
all those affected by the excessive risks taken. So for the argument to work, it must be
possible ‘to defeat [the liability] through insolvency or bankruptcy’:57
To freeze out their involuntary creditors, firms would have to incur secured debt to the
liquidation value of their assets and be willing to go through some kind of liquidation
if the involuntary creditors refused to settle.58
A firm must be willing to liquidate in order to nullify its tort liability by means of an
all-secured debt capital structure.59
However, for smaller firms, especially those which have operated sufficiently long and
widely to have incurred significant ‘involuntary’ (in particular, tort) liabilities, the costs to
the firm’s decision-makers associated with liquidating it are likely to be significant. The
managers of smaller firms, especially those becoming subject to insolvency proceedings in
this country, are very likely to have a substantial equity stake in their company.60 Such
shareholder-managers would also have firm-specific skills and idiosyncratic value invested in
it.61 Very frequently, they would have guaranteed some of their company’s debt,62 and many
would also have lent it significant amounts.63 So a significant proportion of their wealth,
material and non-pecuniary, is likely to be invested in the firm, and this investment will be
undiversified. For this reason, far from being all too ready to liquidate them strategically,
shareholder-managers ‘can be expected to fight [] single-mindedly to keep [them] afloat.’64 It
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should be clear the (non-legal) costs of liquidation to them are likely in most cases to be very
high indeed.
Consider also the differences in the legal context in which the Exploitation
Hypothesis was originally expounded, and here in England where it is now being deployed.
One significant difference is the ‘existing management out’ approach of English insolvency
law, which stands in stark contrast to Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 11
perversely ‘provides a vehicle for a liquidation that can discharge unsecured creditors even
while the owner-managers retain control.’65 If that were not enough, bankruptcy courts
frequently allow the ‘absolute priority rule’ (requiring senior claimants to be fully paid off
before junior classes receive anything) to be breached in return for ‘new value’, so that
shareholder-managers may retain an equity interest even though creditors are not fully paid.66
So the costs to ‘owner’-managers of ‘liquidation’ in the US, in terms of equity interest, job
security and firm-specific human capital, are noticeably lower than in England.67 In addition,
LoPucki states that tort creditors may have little protection from the law if ‘an initially
adequately capitalized corporation [] sank into insolvency and continued to operate in that
condition’ merely on the basis of the gain derived from externalising tort liability.68 Here, of
course, directors would be under the obligation, once there remained no reasonable prospect
of avoiding insolvent liquidation, to take all the steps they reasonably ought to, to minimise
harm to unsecured creditors. Any default on this obligation could be punished by an award of
personal liability against them.69 Yet another difference lies in the attitude of the two
jurisdictions towards the granting of security to cover antecedent debts, another step in the
process through which (LoPucki maintains) tort risks can be externalised: ‘Granting security
for an antecedent debt will never run afoul of [the relevant fraudulent transfer] provision
because... value is given if an antecedent debt is secured’.70 In England, this would be liable
to be challenged as a voidable preference by the liquidator.71 With respect, these differences
between the two jurisdictions may not have received the attention they deserve from those
attempting to transplant the Exploitation Hypothesis to this country.
Consider the implications of the points just made. All the costs mentioned above
(legal and otherwise) must be weighed in the scales against the benefits to be derived from
liquidating a company in order to externalise tort and other liabilities. For smaller companies
(i.e. most of those likely to become subject to insolvency law), the costs are significant, as
already noted. Their shareholder-managers would lose their jobs, their equity stake, and
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substantial undiversified firm-specific wealth.72 They might also become subject to legal
liability. Creditors who accept security in such circumstances might face the possibility of
having the objectionable transactions reversed. So the expected benefits from the
externalisation of tort risks etc. would have to be very substantial to outweigh the expected
costs. However, as already noted, smaller firms are unlikely to be able to operate on a scale
large enough to incur extensive involuntary debts.73 Now recall that the benefits of risk
externalisation are supposed to arise from the reduction in interest rates on secured loans.74
These ‘subsidies’ are likely to be very small in comparison with the costs of liquidation.
To illustrate this point, here is a simple example to work through. Given that most
firms have less than £1 million of total liabilities when they become subject to insolvency
proceedings, give LoPucki the benefit of the doubt by assuming a fairly large secured loan
from Lender to Debtor which will stand at £500,000 at the time of liquidation.75 Now banks
do not lend at all, secured or unsecured, at rates 7.5% over base rate.76 Let the base rate be
8%. Assume that without security, Debtor would only be able to borrow at the rate of 15%
(i.e. at about the limit beyond which banks refuse to lend) because of the riskiness of its
proposed project, but with security, the rate falls incredibly to 10% (this again gives LoPucki
benefit of the doubt by maximising the interest rate benefit of security).77 Debtor is to remain
in business for ten years before liquidating.78 This gives a generously long period for the
objectionable ‘subsidy’ to continue and allows for plenty of ‘involuntary’ debts to be
accumulated. Note though that almost inevitably, this also increases the costs of liquidation
in terms of the shareholder-manager’s human capital and idiosyncratic investments. Lender
lends in four equal instalments at 2.5 year intervals starting in the first year, and let us assume
(in LoPucki’s favour) that the whole of the capital is outstanding at the end of the period. The
total ‘subsidy’ is therefore £156,250.79 This figure is by no means negligible, even if the
‘saving’ accrues over ten years. In return for this sum, however, which results from stated
and un-stated assumptions incredibly favourable to his thesis, LoPucki’s argument requires
the shareholder-manager to incur tort debts and then liquidate his firm, thereby losing
material and non-pecuniary investments worth a decade of his life and risking legal liability.
In light of this example,80 it is fairly certain that for shareholder-managers of smaller firms,
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externalisation-motivated liquidation would very rarely (if ever at all) be a viable
proposition.81
Here, then, are the reasons why LoPucki’s arguments apply to a null set. Large firms
with potentially a large number of involuntary creditors do not give security even when
facing very extensive such liabilities, and mostly end up paying those debts. Smaller firms,
which do issue secured debt and which constitute an overwhelming proportion of the subjects
of insolvency law, do not ordinarily have the capacity to incur involuntary debts large enough
to render attractive any externalisation-motivated attempt to liquidate. The Exploitation
Hypothesis is therefore left with no part of the corporate world to which to apply. Therefore,
it certainly does not explain ‘why secured credit is such a widespread phenomenon.’82 And
because of the differences in the two legal systems, this is even truer here than in the US.83
What about evidence? We can to a certain extent test the Hypothesis using empirical
data from this jurisdiction. LoPucki would explain the pattern by which security becomes
widely-employed by asserting that [A] firms would reduce equity in their capital structure,
[B] create large amounts of tort liability, [C] ‘incur secured debt to the liquidation value of
their assets’, and then [D] undergo an insolvent liquidation.84 As more and more firms
discovered this easy way of making a profit, [E] the trend would be for firms to be
increasingly tort judgment-proof:
Equilibrium would be an all-secured debt capital structure because real tort exposure
would be zero. Any change in that capital structure would increase real tort exposure.
Reputational concerns would tend to disappear in the intense competition of a world
where transaction costs are small.85
But for small firms, which are the most likely to be liquidated insolvent, the trend is actually
towards more equity and more internal finance in the firm’s capital structure (therefore, more
real exposure to tort liability). In the 1987-90 period, 65% of small businesses sought
external financing of whatever type. In 1995-97, this figure had fallen dramatically to only
39%.86 Since equity is (and even more strongly, shareholder-managers’ own funds are) not
being reduced as a proportion of small firm capital structure, and since the trend is in the
opposite direction, Propositions A and E are false. Further, according to the Hypothesis, it
would be clearly more rewarding for businesses to shut down only once a substantial number
of ‘involuntary’ (especially tort) claimants had been swept up in its liability net and the firm
81
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was insolvent. However, twelve times as many businesses close without defaulting on any
debts, as those that become insolvent.87 So Proposition D is palpably false. We do not know
how many tort debts go unpaid in liquidation, and the data relied on by the supporters of the
Exploitation Hypothesis shows when there are large liabilities of this nature, little secured
debt is issued and those liabilities are mostly met. So Proposition B is either false, or more
charitably, unproved. It must be said however that the likelihood of its being true is very
remote indeed, for the reasons suggested above. We are left with Proposition C, that firms
would issue secured debt to the liquidation value of their assets before liquidating. Even if
true, this by itself would just beg the question, since why this should be so is precisely what
the other -- false -- parts of the Hypothesis were trying to explain. Based on these predictions
and data at least, few things are as demonstrably wrong in the debate about secured lending
as the claim that it exists to externalise risk onto tort (or other ‘involuntary’) creditors.
Even apart from all this, there is an additional reason to question the proposition that
the existence of the priority of secured claims leads to the exploitation of tort creditors in
insolvency. This is because, in this jurisdiction, most tort creditors are unlikely to bear the
insolvency risk of their debtors in the first place, regardless of whether the latter have
borrowed secured. Here is why. While we face once again the problem that little empirical
evidence is available on this point, it is very likely that most tort claims arise either from
diseases contracted or injuries sustained at the workplace, or from road accidents. And in
both situations, the claim would be covered by extensive compulsory insurance schemes. In
the employment context, the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1998
now require most employers to have a minimum cover of £5m for all risks. This is
complimented by the ‘no-fault’ Industrial Injuries Scheme. As for road accidents, the Road
Traffic Act 1988 requires that users of motor vehicles secure unlimited cover in respect of
death or personal injury.88 In either case, and should the insured party become insolvent, the
Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 effects a statutory transfer to the victim of
the right to recover from the insurer.89 In addition, section 151 of the Road Traffic Act
restricts the insurers’ ability to refuse to pay the injured person on the basis that they would
have been entitled to cancel or avoid the insurance contract as against the insured. Finally,
even if the driver involved in a road accident is uninsured or untraced, the victim may have
recourse against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau to make good his loss.90 The cumulative effect of
these provisions is to move the risk of the tort-feasor’s insolvency from the victim to the
insurer. This also means that any alleged “subsidy” that might have been created by
subordinating tort claims to secured ones disappears: it is a fair bet the debtor’s insurers
would set premiums taking into account the level of risk associated with its business.91
If there is any concern that secured credit is purposely being used to defeat
‘involuntary’ liabilities on a large scale in this jurisdiction (as the Exploitation Hypothesis
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suggests), then it is surely imperative that empirical research be conducted to test whether
that is the case. In particular, if significant amounts of tort debts are regularly going unpaid in
corporate liquidations while secured creditors sweep up everything, that deserves to be a
scandal and we should hear about it. However, such an argument (and a rather serious
charge) would be difficult to sustain on the strength of a study based in a very different legal
system; it could not be made at all on the basis of evidence that seems in fact to repudiate the
argument. Nor can this evidence be employed to justify proposals to ‘improve’ the institution
of secured credit, especially to ‘protect’ tort victims.92 It is suggested that unless hard facts
and more persuasive arguments are forthcoming, the Exploitation Hypothesis should be
retired from service. Tort claimants not being available for this purpose, critics of security
must find someone else to save from secured creditors.93

3. Exploitation and ‘uninformed’ creditors
In view of the analysis above and given the present state of evidence and arguments, it is
submitted the Exploitation Hypothesis is somewhat lacking in plausibility. That conclusion
should carry over to this Section. Here, the exploitation is supposed to be of ‘incompetent’94
creditors who systematically underestimate the risk of the debtor’s business and who
therefore charge less than they would if they could make a more accurate assessment. The
argument is that the debtor can (as before) sell their insolvency share to secured creditors
who, upon receiving security, do not then raise their rates (since their claims are not diluted
by the addition of claims held by these ‘incompetent’ creditors), while enjoying under-priced
loans from such creditors in the first place. The blame, it seems, lies with the deceptive
nature of the institution of secured credit.
It should be clearly understood that the dispute here is about the existence of a class
of creditor that is ‘uninformed’ about the need to deal with risk, and of the consequences of
the existence of security. No one would deny that some creditors often do not have all the
relevant information about a particular debtor. There is every reason to think there are
informational asymmetries of this sort, both between creditor and debtor, and between
different types of creditor.95 Rather, the controversy (insofar as it touches this point) concerns
the argument that some creditors do not even realise the existence of such asymmetries, nor
the consequences of their debtor’s having borrowed on a secured basis, do not react
appropriately in response, and are ‘exploited’ as a result.

92

Finch herself does not seem to believe tort creditors are in need of special protection under English
insolvency law; see Finch and Worthington, ‘The pari passu principle and ranking restitutionary rights’,
in Rose (ed.), Restitution and Insolvency (2000), 1, 4. It is at least troublesome, then, attempting to
reconcile this with the many arguments she makes that either the institution of secured credit, or the
justifications provided in its support, are defective because they overlook the special position of tort
creditors; see Finch, above n 11 at, eg, 655, 661, 662, 664, etc.
93
The argument in this Section applies equally to Bebchuk-Fried’s claim, above n 14 at 898-900, and
again, above n 37 at 1319-1320, that the priority of secured credit encourages firms to take insufficient
precautions to minimise tortious harm for the reasons described by LoPucki. Their argument is
fallacious (at least as applied to English law) because they pay no attention to the considerable costs of
liquidation to shareholder-managers of firms which issue secured debt. To the extent to which their
argument on this point is distinct from the Exploitation Hypothesis, it is examined further below.
94
The term comes from Schwartz ‘Security interests and bankruptcy priorities: A review of current
theories’ (1981) 10 J Legal Studies 1, 36. See also LoPucki, above n 1 at 1916.
95
Indeed, some of the monitoring efficiencies said to arise from the existence of security build upon
this proposition.

A. Uninformed In The Market
It has to be said that the argument just summarised does not seem free of difficulties. First
and importantly, it seems to ignore the fact that the required ability to deal with risk is not
specific to the peculiarities of any one aspect of the legal system. So for example, a creditor
would have to calculate the probability of its debtor’s insolvency, or at least the average rate
of default in its industry, even if there were no secured credit. It remains to be demonstrated
that parties who can do this cannot then assimilate and react to the simple fact that general
unsecured creditors do not often get anything in their debtor’s (insolvent) liquidation. And
contrary to this argument’s basic premise, ‘it is generally acknowledged that small firms
today are more professionally managed -- by people with more business acumen -- and
assisted by a wider network of support agencies.’96 There is little reason to think this is any
less true for firms that have to extend credit (probably almost all of them).
Further, LoPucki does not quite succeed in revealing who these ‘uninformed’
creditors are. The evidence he cites even for the existence of such creditors is, at its highest,
anecdotal.97 LoPucki mentions a reported case as demonstrating the potential for exploitation
of ‘uninformed’ creditors. However, as he himself notes, there was no ‘exploitation’ even
there; the eventual decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois ensured that in fact, the
‘uninformed’ creditor prevailed!98 The LoPucki-Whitford study is also brandished again to
show that ‘in 4 of the 43 cases [] studied (9%), the CEOs were indicted for fraud against
creditors. In several others, the SEC brought administrative charges for such fraud.’99 But of
course this is all quite irrelevant as an argument against secured credit, the amount of
secured debt being relatively minuscule for almost all the firms in the study.100 Again, if the
argument is meant to show that secured credit exists (at least in part) to sell the share of
‘uninformed’ creditors to secured ones, the study itself consists of stunning counterexamples.
Given that the identification of ‘uninformed’ creditors is hazy at best and the
evidence cited is inappropriate, this part of LoPucki’s argument might well have been treated
as no more than an irrelevance here. As it happens, though, Finch has seized on the basic
insight that there might be a significant number of ‘unsophisticated’ creditors ready to be
taken advantage of by security in this jurisdiction. She seems to make several arguments
premised on the existence of parties who act as if they were ‘uninformed’, either because of
personal or market reasons.101 Remember that they all aim to show how some players in the
market systematically under-price their loans, thus allowing coalitions of debtors and
security-holders to appropriate a part of their bankruptcy value.
First, Finch envisages a voluntary creditor who anticipates clearly that the granting of
security by its debtor to another of its creditors would make its own position worse off. To
compensate, it realises it should adjust the terms on which it does business in order to make
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up for the expected loss of insolvency value. However, the industry in which it trades
contains ‘ill-informed and cavalier [operators who] may be willing to offer terms that
undercut [our wiser but impotent protagonist] in the market. The [latter] will, accordingly,
feel that it cannot adjust and, indeed, that resources spent on evaluating the need for
adjustment... would be wasted.’ The same calculation is made by many (or most) operators in
the industry. This state of affairs is undesirable.102
The obvious reply must, with respect, be that operators who are ‘cavalier’ about
accepting unjustified risks would soon go out of business, while the prudent operator who
expends resources adjusting to risks would be rewarded with higher profits and commercial
longevity. Finch herself notes a paragraph later that some ‘trade creditors [would] have gone
out of business through their failure to adjust -- perhaps in their early weeks and years.’ She
uses this as yet another argument against secured credit, stating that ‘These lost enterprises
involve costs to society.’103 This is hard to understand. On her premises, in fact, such trade
creditors should systematically include (by definition, since we are concerned with risk) a far
higher proportion of those being ‘cavalier’ about it than those dealing with it prudently.
Indeed, the more cavalier the operator or the more ill-informed it is about the consequences
of its decisions, the more hasty should be its demise.104 The trend should be for the market to
be purged of the cavalier and the ill-informed. The persistence in the market of such actors
seems unlikely to account for the existence of security, nor does it seem likely to provide a
significant source of exploitation.
Finch asserts that some ‘ill-informed and ill-equipped’ parties may be unable to
adjust and unable to learn because they ‘operate in dispersed, changing markets in which
learning is difficult, the process of matching prices to risks may take a long time and may be
delayed, distorted or prevented by changes of actors and the arrival in the market of numbers
of unsophisticated operators who fail adequately to consider risks.’105 This argument is, with
great respect, not entirely satisfactory. What are these ‘dispersed, changing markets in which
learning is difficult’, and in which industry do they exist?106 Why are parties compelled to
operate in the whole of these dispersed markets? Parties who suffered from having to operate
thus would soon specialise in one (or some) sector(s), thereby improving their ability to learn
and adjust. Or some newcomers -- though aware that operators in this industry traditionally
traded widely -- would be forced through financial constraints to start out on a small scale in
one such sector (or in fewer ones than is customary), and would find (on Finch’s
assumptions) that they did better than competitors struggling in many different ones. Others
would be likely to learn from their success and follow their example. Alternatively, suppose
it is impossible (say for technological reasons) to specialise in some of these ‘dispersed’
markets rather than operating in them all. If so, the costs arising from the drawn out process
of ‘matching prices to risks’ cannot be regarded as objectionable, since ex hypothesi these
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costs cannot be avoided by any of the relevant players. It is submitted none of this constitutes
an argument against the priority of secured claims.

B. Uninformed Because ‘Unsophisticated’
Consider now the argument that, to this author at least, seems to have truly startling
implications. The claim is that there might be ‘a permanent subsidy to borrowers’ because of
the continuous flow into the market of ‘ill-informed and ill-equipped parties’.107 Parties who
are merely ‘ill-informed’ because of market reasons would soon become informed; otherwise
they would go out of business. So let us now focus on parties which are ‘ill-equipped’,
presumably because of personal reasons, to learn from the markets etc.108 The assertion that
these parties exist in the marketplace in significant numbers is meant to support proposals to
‘improve’ the system of secured credit to ‘protect’ them.109 Disregard for the moment that
because of the purging effect of the market, such individuals are unlikely to be numerous at
any given time, so that ‘victimizing’ them through the use of security is unlikely to be a
profitable pursuit, and therefore unlikely to explain the ubiquity of secured credit.110
So the argument is that certain players enter into business some part of which
requires them to extend credit. This in turn means they must understand (inter alia) how
security operates in that industry, what are the laws governing its use, what the rates of
default and of insolvency are in it, what commercial actors can expect if they do not have
security and their debtor becomes insolvent, and if possible, what is the likelihood of their
particular debtor defaulting or becoming insolvent. However, the players we are concerned
with are ‘ill-equipped’ to meet (some of) these requirements. This means they underestimate
the prices they should charge in order to be compensated, should their debtor become
insolvent at some point after having issued secured credit. It also means they are ejected from
the market more frequently than other players not as ‘ill-equipped’ as them. This leads to the
conclusion that the institution of secured credit is both exploitative and inefficient.
This argument is troublesome. For one thing, the need to deal with risk is not related
to the institution of secured credit, as already noted, and would inevitably exist even if no one
ever lent secured. At least in a market economy, some business ventures would succeed and
others fail,111 and those deciding to enter the market would have to make judgements about
the likelihood of failure of their proposed business partners (their suppliers and buyers).
Given the ever-present possibility of failure, they would be reckless indeed not to think of
what would happen, should failure strike those they do business with. Such considerations
would include questions about the resilience of their own venture in such circumstances.
Further, if the economy is based on credit, the possibility of insolvency must be thrown into
the mix. Business people must school themselves in the art of deciding what they should
charge for their product, taking into account all these complexities of commercial life. The
existence of secured credit simply is not implicated in the story so far. Once it is introduced,
firms must learn to survive despite not being paid much on their outstanding loans to their
counter-party (there would be some loss from a counter-party’s insolvency, even if the latter
had never borrowed on a secured basis). Parties ‘ill-equipped’ to deal with this rather trivial
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additional complexity are unlikely to do much better even if the institution of security did not
exist.112
Suppose though that we accept that such ‘ill-equipped’ actors do occasionally enter
the market, do then create a ‘subsidy’ for others by under-pricing their loans, and are ejected
from the market quicker than others. Does this mean the institution of secured credit, perhaps
by hastening their demise, is exploitative or inefficient, and ought therefore to be reformed?
It should be noted first of all how difficult it is to assess the merits of such a suggestion.
Suppose the level of protection accorded to ‘ill-equipped’ parties from the effects of secured
credit were to be significantly increased. Some creditors would still inevitably fall below the
threshold of that protection. What happens then? Since it is probably impossible to guarantee
that no one would ever be ‘taken advantage of’ because of their inability to deal with
commercial uncertainty and risk, or because of their ignorance of how banks operate, or
because of their misinterpretation of the law of secured credit etc., all we could do would be
to alter the threshold below which protection is denied. But for all we know, that threshold
might lie roughly at the right level today. On this point, the most that can be said in favour of
those proposing ‘reform’ on these grounds is that we cannot be certain, since they do not
provide any information about how many such ‘ill-equipped’ creditors there might be today.
This also means we cannot know how much ‘protective’ regulation should be added to cut
down the number of those ‘exploited’ by way of secured credit by (say) one-half.
What is more, it does not seem to this author desirable for the law to ensure that
members of society continue for as long as possible to do what ex hypothesi they are not very
good at doing. Society has adopted the attitude that individuals are generally not to be
prevented from entering the occupation of their choice. However, this same freedom
necessitates that one must also face up to the consequences of that choice. So until society
decides to abandon the position that the market should be allowed to encourage those not
terribly good in their chosen profession to apply their talents elsewhere, surely no such
argument would be persuasive in the debate about secured credit. Nothing justifies isolating
‘unsophisticated’ unsecured creditors from plumbers, actors, and soccer players of
comparable abilities, so it is submitted that nothing requires them to be shielded from the
consequences of their decisions any more than all others. Further and importantly, if the
argument is that some business people cannot comprehend how security operates, can they
understand and comply with tax and VAT, health and safety, consumer and environmental
protection requirements, which are unlikely to be any less complicated? Those proposing
‘reform’ to the institution of secured credit on these grounds must surely bear the burden of
demonstrating that all these issues can be satisfactorily addressed.
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4. ‘Non-adjusting’ creditors, the Inefficiency Hypothesis, and the rate
reduction assumption
Bebchuk and Fried have given the most systematic statement of what here will be called the
Inefficiency Hypothesis.113 They argue that ‘under the rule of full priority, the creation of a
security interest diverts value from creditors that do not “adjust” the size of their claims to
take into account the effect of the loan transaction that creates the security interest’.114
Security allows the debtor to transfer to secured creditors some of the insolvency value of
such ‘non-adjusters’. In return, the secured creditor charges them a lower rate of interest,
reflecting the fact that its claim would not now have to rank pari passu with those of nonadjusting creditors. A ‘non-adjusting’ creditor, then, is one who ‘cannot or does not adjust
the terms of its loan to reflect the effect on its loan of all the arrangements the borrower
enters into with other creditors, including the creation of security interests which, under full
priority, completely subordinate the nonadjusting creditor’s claim in bankruptcy.’115
Bebchuk and Fried are more at ease than LoPucki accepting that security might be
beneficial and efficient as well as merely redistributive (from non-adjusting creditors to
debtor and secured creditor) and inefficient. They explain that since the security interest
encumbers the collateral and affords the secured creditor both a superior remedy and priority
to the proceeds of its realisation, it reduces the borrower’s ability to overinvest by selling
those assets and embarking on an inefficient project. It discourages asset dilution by way of
transfer of those assets to the debtor’s shareholders. It reduces the costs to the secured debtor
of dealing with a default. Security also discourages inefficient behaviour on part of the debtor
by increasing the expected costs of non-compliance with value-increasing covenants in the
loan contract.116
Here is how the inefficiencies are supposed to arise. Bebchuk and Fried accept that to
the extent that security increases the wealth of all the parties, it is of course desirable. But
security interests will be granted beyond this point not because of their social benefit, but
simply because they allow the debtor to reduce its own financing costs by selling the
insolvency share of non-adjusters. On the margins, therefore, the role of security is merely
redistributive. And second, security interests would sometimes be used precisely for
redistributive purposes when debtor misbehaviour might more effectively have been
controlled by use of non-security covenants.117
This, then, is the Inefficiency Hypothesis, and we must decide what to make of it. It is
submitted the Hypothesis is seriously undermined – at least as it applies to this jurisdiction –
by empirical evidence now available. However, the same evidence also calls into question
one of the most deeply embedded and seemingly obvious intuitions underlying the debate
about security. This is what we must begin by unearthing. It is important to notice the
structure of the argument above. According to Bebchuk and Fried, the existence of secured
credit does allow the secured creditor to control debtor misbehaviour. This benefits all of
those with claims against the latter, and therefore maximises social value. The secured
creditor-to-be anticipates the lower costs to it of administering this loan in the way described
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above, and of an increase in its share of bankruptcy value, and so lowers the interest it
charges. The debtor for its part offers security to enjoy the benefits of this lower interest rate.
As the argument is presented, the problem arises only after all the gains from the secured
creditor’s ability to control debtor misbehaviour have accrued. Beyond this point, the secured
creditor will lend cheaper on a secured rather than unsecured basis only because the priority
associated with secured status allows it to obtain a greater part of the debtor’s estate, should
the latter become insolvent. And the debtor still has an incentive to offer security because of
the attraction of cheaper loans from the secured creditor. Now security is doing nothing but
transferring bankruptcy value from one set of creditors to another. The losers in this process
can do nothing about it since, ex hypothesi, they are unable to adjust the terms on which they
lend.118
Now, the linchpin of this argument, the assumption that does all the work here, is the
obvious one that secured credit is cheaper than unsecured credit. Call this the ‘rate reduction
assumption’. The assumption seems reasonable: after all, having priority does (by definition)
improve a creditor’s position in its debtor’s insolvency compared to what it would otherwise
be. So this difference must obviously be reflected in the price to be charged for debt. Of
course if there were no difference in rates between secured and unsecured debt, then this
argument simply would not work. It is important to understand why. If the assumption holds,
secured creditors-to-be are indifferent between being asked to lend unsecured and charging a
high interest rate on the one hand, and taking security and reducing the price of their loan on
the other. It is the debtor that has an incentive to offer security, precisely because it can
pocket the difference in interest rates. If there were no difference between borrowing secured
and borrowing unsecured, there would from the debtor’s perspective be a strong disincentive
to offer security. We should remember that on Bebchuk and Fried’s premises, security has
two broad roles. It may facilitate a transfer of bankruptcy value from non-adjusting to secured
creditors, but this transfer is consummated only once the debtor becomes insolvent. While it
is still solvent, however, security allows the secured creditor to restrict the debtor’s freedom
of action, preventing it from engaging in over-investment, asset dilution, and because of the
‘hostage’ role of security, extracting from it scrupulous compliance with debt covenants. The
debtor’s shareholder-managers suffer from the existence of security, on Bebchuk-Fried’s
view. So they must be compensated handsomely through a reduction in price of the nowsecured loan, if the debtor is to offer security at all.119
The rate reduction assumption is quite crucial to these major attacks on security,
then.120 And so strongly accepted is it that the defence of the priority of secured credit in this
paper so far has also proceeded as if it were true.121 Yet it is now contended that there is
reason to think the way this assumption operates in the attacks on security is quite fallacious
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(at least in the English context). The evidencefor this is discussed below. It would be helpful
first to set the theoretical context of this relationship between risk, interest rates and security.
Let us start by disentangling two distinct factors that might be at play in determining
whether the rate reduction assumption is valid. The first one, which the literature refers to as
financial agency costs, has already been mentioned. The debtor’s management has an
incentive to engage in behaviour harmful to its creditors. They might ‘overinvest’ by putting
the borrowed capital in projects with a negative present value, or dilute the existing lenders’
claims by borrowing more, or simply by distributing corporate assets to shareholders in the
form of excessive dividend payments. Since all these activities increase the prior lenders’
risk, those capable of adjusting their rates would have an incentive to demand a higher
interest rate at the time the loan is made. Now to the extent that security mitigates this risk
(by discouraging misbehaviour), it serves as a substitute for a higher interest rate. Very
simply put, a secured loan is for this reason likely to be cheaper than an unsecured one, all
other things being equal. But as already pointed out above, to the extent that this factor
explains the relative cheapness of secured debt, it is accepted by critics like Bebchuk-Fried to
be beneficial to all of the firm’s creditors, unsecured as well as secured (since financial
agency costs hurt them all).
But the second of the two factors just mentioned might ensures that the relationship
between security and interest rates is not always inverse. From the lender’s perspective, and
focussing for a moment only on unsecured loans, raising interest rates beyond a certain point
might well be self-defeating. This is because potential borrowers who offer to pay more ex
ante, may not end up paying more ex post. Those offering to borrow at higher interest rates
might be willing to do so only because they intend to undertake riskier projects, or are overestimating the success or profitability of their projects, or are simply dishonest. It follows that
as the interest rates charged by a lender creep up, the average quality of its borrower would
tend to decline. This adverse selection effect also means that as interest rates increase, less
risky borrowers would drop out of the market, finding credit to be prohibitively expensive
(remember that their lower-risk projects also yield lower returns). What is more, rates
increased in order to compensate the borrower against the risk of debtor misbehaviour, might
in fact generate additional motivation costs, as debtors are pushed into taking excessive risks
to finance the higher costs of borrowing. Instead of compensating the lender for its portfolio
risk, then, high interest rates might increase that risk. One way of avoiding this ‘moral
hazard’ problem would be for the lender to ‘ration’ credit instead of raising rates. Keeping
the rates lower would attract better-quality borrowers back into the market. It would also
ensure, however, that some good potential borrowers who nevertheless have an ex ante risk
profile necessitating a somewhat higher rate do not obtain credit.122
Introducing security back into the picture, we can now see that it might sometimes
substitute, not for higher interest rates, but for refusing credit altogether. Some loans might
be made because the lender’s ex ante risk is mitigated by the priority it would now enjoy in
any subsequent insolvency, when without that priority, an ‘adequate’ interest rate would be
beyond the level where the adverse selection and moral hazard problems become acute.
Importantly for our purposes, it should be noted that in this situation, the rate reduction
assumption turns out to be the rate reduction fallacy. Here, the choice would not be between
borrowing at a high rate without offering security, and obtaining a lower rate by offering it. It
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would instead be that between borrowing (at a relatively high rate) by offering security, and
not borrowing at all.
To the extent that this analysis holds, we have a way of testing the anti-security
Hypotheses. Both predict that for troubled firms which might eventually become insolvent,
there should be a difference in the price of secured and unsecured loans made by banks (i.e.
creditors which lend both with and without security), secured credit being cheaper. On the
other hand, if such a relationship is lacking, then we have reason to doubt the validity of the
anti-security attacks, at least as they stand. We would then have to decide whether the ability
of security to avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard problems itself creates costs for
unsecured creditors.
Now for the relevant evidence, which comes from a recent study conducted by Julian
Franks and Oren Sussman (hereafter, ‘Franks-Sussman’) on behalf of the Working Group on
Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms.123 Franks-Sussman persuaded
three large UK clearing banks to grant them access to private records on 542 companies, all
of which had entered the central ‘rescue units’ of these banks during a certain sampling
period. The stated purpose of these units is to ‘intervene early in the cycle of a company’s
decline and provide a greater opportunity for rescue and recovery, without necessarily
resorting to formal procedures’.124 Firms in the unit are kept under close supervision, and
might either recover and be sent back to the bank branch, or close their account and take their
business elsewhere, or come to be regarded as beyond (informal) rescue and consigned to
another of the bank’s units (the ‘debt recovery unit’) and then perhaps to a formal insolvency
procedure.125
An important test conducted by Franks-Sussman on the data obtained from one of the
banks was aimed at discovering the relationship between interest rate spreads and the
characteristics of firms as they entered the bank’s rescue unit.126 Two of their findings are
particularly relevant here. First, the relationship between the ratio of security value to bank
debt on the one hand and the interest charged on the loan on the other, while being an inverse
one, was the second least significant (approximately) of all those tested. In other words, how
much of the bank’s debt was secured was only marginally related to the interest charged on
the loan, if it was related at all.127 Changes in the interest rate were to be explained
123
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overwhelmingly by factors other than the proportion of bank debt secured. And second, there
was a ‘highly significant’ direct relationship (perhaps the second strongest of all the factors
considered) between whether the bank had been given personal guarantees for some part of
its loan, and the interest it charged on it.128 The greater the likelihood that a guarantee had
been given, the higher the interest charged.
This has dramatic implications for the Inefficiency – and equally the Exploitation –
Hypotheses. For this data at least, it simply is not the case that a debtor can mechanically
obtain a reduction in its interest bill by offering security. This should be read together with
Franks-Sussman’s finding that bank debt was ‘almost universally secured’ through a
combination of fixed and floating charges.129 It does not, then, seem to be a matter of choice
for the debtor to bargain with its main bank, offering security in return for a lower interest
rate.130 Security will be extracted as a matter of course from companies likely to end up in the
bank’s rescue unit (and therefore those most relevant to the two Hypotheses),131 and it may
not lead to any noticeable reduction in interest charges. For such companies, and consistent
with the analysis above, the difference between offering security and not offering it does not
appear to be that between borrowing at lower or higher rates, but more likely that between
borrowing and not being able to borrow at all.132 As explained above, both the Inefficiency
and the Exploitation Hypotheses are heavily dependent on the contrary assumption to explain
why security is asked for and offered. Both must therefore be considered weakened.
That is not all. Suppose we take the interest charged on the bank loan to be related to
the bank’s assessment of the borrower’s riskiness.133 The discussion above indicates taking
security over the latter’s assets is by no means the most discriminating way in which the bank
responds to this risk (since security is taken anyway from this type of firm, and since the
extent to which it covers the loan is not strongly associated with the interest rate). In fact, a
more focused method of dealing with risk seems to be to extract a personal guarantee from
the firm’s shareholder-managers. Only this explains the ‘highly significant’ relationship
between the incidence of such guarantees and the rates of interest. The riskier a firm is
perceived to be, the higher the interest it is charged (of course subject to the limits set by the
adverse selection and moral hazard problems), and the more likely its directors are to be
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required to provide personal guarantees.134 The finding that the incidence of directors’
guarantees seems remarkably more discriminating than that of security over the firm’s
assets135 also strongly supports the view that, amongst the firms likely to end up in its rescue
unit, this is the method the bank uses to separate the riskier from the less risky borrower.
We should think again about the two Hypotheses we are testing. Both assert that
security is offered because the debtor (and here this must mean its shareholder-managers)
wishes to sell off the insolvency share of involuntary, uninformed, or non-adjusting creditors
(more accurately put, only when this happens do the criticisms implied by the two
Hypotheses kick in). So (a) the reward they receive in all cases is the reduction in interest
rates, and, (b) their insolvency costs are unaffected. We can see however that both limbs of
this type of argument are wrong. As the riskiness of the firm’s activities increases, (a) the
interest charged to the firm may go up, and (b) the shareholder-managers’ private
(insolvency-linked) expected costs also increase.136 This evidence shows that regardless of
the existence of security, operating riskily and aiming at a strategic liquidation becomes
increasingly unattractive, and any incentive to create tortious harm (in the expectation that it
could later painlessly be defeated through insolvency) diminishes even further. The
Exploitation Hypothesis is therefore deprived of any vestigial plausibility. And there remain
neither incentive nor scope for debtors to sell the insolvency share of non-adjusting creditors
to a secured creditor in order to pocket the interest payment savings (there being none). So
the Inefficiency Hypothesis too starts to crumble.
There is yet another finding of the Franks-Sussman study that – to the extent that it
can be generalised – should be regarded as fairly decisive against the type of attack on
security now being discussed. This concerns the relationship between interest rates and the
ratio of bank debt to total debt. Let us think about what we should expect this to be, if the
lines of argument we have been considering (derived from the two Hypotheses) led to truth.
The way the rate reduction assumption is made implies that the borrower has two options. It
can either operate sensibly, not increase the risk of default faced by its creditors, take
reasonable precautions to prevent tortious harm, and enjoy a relatively low interest rate on
the unsecured loan from its main bank. Alternatively, it can engage in risky activities which
increase the variance of its returns and thus its shareholder value, but also simultaneously its
chances of facing an insolvent liquidation. It can save money by not taking sufficient
precautions against potential tort liability. But it can then issue security to its bank and thus
continue to enjoy the same (or in any case, not significantly higher) rates on the loans made
to it by the latter. The bank’s pricing decision is very simple. In the first scenario, the bank
anticipates a low probability of default on its loan, and a small pool of other claims with
equal priority with its own, and thus charges a low interest rate. In the second, it anticipates a
higher probability of default, a large number of other claims, but still the same expected
recovery on its loan because of the priority it now has. So it charges more or less the same
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So here (as, with great respect, on so many other occasions), Goode seems to have been right after
all when he observed (well before the Franks-Sussman study), in Principle of Corporate Insolvency
Law (2nd edn, 1997) at 41, that ‘It is assumed as an article of faith that a creditor taking security will
charge a lower rate of interest than one who lends on an unsecured basis… But this is simply not how
lending works. Banks charge what they consider the market will bear. A bank does not quote a lower
rate of interest because it is secured; it takes security because of a perceived risk of non-payment and
may charge a higher rate because of the risk. Similarly, the mere fact that a loan is unsecured does not
necessarily mean that the bank will charge a higher rate’ (emphasis in the original, footnote omitted).
We now know of course that security is taken as the risk on the loan rises (and higher interest rates
would cause adverse selection and moral hazard). For especially risky firms, the interest rate very
clearly goes up, and guarantees are demanded from the firm’s directors.
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low interest rate. The number of other claimants simply does not matter to it, as long as it has
priority over all of their claims. This is how the rate reduction assumption operates in the two
Hypotheses. In view of this, and given the near-universality of security in the FranksSussman data set, we should expect no significant relationship between interest rates and the
proportion of bank to total debt.
A different prediction emerges from the two Hypotheses for debtors which were
more obviously and seriously in trouble before eventually being liquidated insolvent. Here,
the secured creditor (in practice, the bank) would have a higher expected rate of recovery in
the debtor’s insolvency if it had available to it a ‘cushion’ of value provided by other
creditors. This is the bankruptcy value supposedly sold to it through the use of priority by the
debtor. The latter is rewarded with lower interest rates. The bigger the cushion, the greater
the protection accorded to the secured creditor. It follows that the bigger the cushion, the
lower the interest rates charged by it.137 Now the size of this cushion is inversely represented
by the ratio of bank to total debt. The smaller the proportion of total debt that is owed to the
bank, the greater is the protection available to it. This is because the debt owed to the
priority-holding bank is more likely to be repaid (and repaid in full), the greater the
proportion of the debtor’s estate derived from value provided by the other, subordinate,
creditors. And on the views being explored, it is precisely because the secured creditor
expects to be able to appropriate (some of) this value that it would reduce its interest charges.
On the strength of the two Hypotheses, then, and to the extent that this contingency could be
reflected in interest rates, we should expect a direct relationship here: the smaller the ratio of
bank to total debt, the lower the interest charged by the bank. And since this mechanism is
supposed to explain much (Exploitation) or at least the objectionable bit (Inefficiency) of the
ubiquity of security, this relationship should be fairly significant. So if the Hypotheses have
any validity, the relationship between the ratio of bank to total debt and interest rates should
either be direct and significant (as explained in this paragraph), or simply insignificant (as the
previous paragraph explains).
Franks-Sussman’s findings for this variable were indeed ‘highly significant’ (one of
the strongest of all the relationships tested). They were also exactly the reverse of what the
anti-security Hypotheses would have us expect! In other words, the greater the proportion of
total debt that was owed to the bank, and therefore the smaller the cushion of value provided
by other creditors (and thus available for appropriation to the bank), the lower was the
interest rate charged on its loan by the bank.138 To the extent that the implications of these
findings can be generalised, then, secured creditors very clearly do not display predatory
intentions towards value contributed by other creditors, at least in the pricing of their loans.
Nor, it therefore follows, do they create an incentive for the debtor to ‘sweep in’ significant
amounts of this value in order to sell it to the secured creditor in return for lower interest
rates. In fact, as we have just seen, secured creditors seem positively to discourage debtors
from borrowing too much from other creditors by unambiguously charging them higher
interest rates, the greater the proportional value derived from other creditors. This surely
leaves little room for doubt. It is submitted this – in addition to all the other evidence
discussed in this paper – proves that arguments meant to explain the prevalence of secured
credit, but based on debtor-secured creditor coalitions extracting ‘subsidies’ from an
assortment of involuntary, uninformed, ‘ill-equipped’, and non-adjusting creditors, all just do
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At least until the point where the secured creditor’s risk diminishes to a level where the cost to it of
offering lower interest rates outweighs the benefits to it of further risk reductions.
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not hold water.139 Therefore, very simply, they cannot be used to base suggestions for
‘improvements’ to the institution of secured credit.140

5. Informal ‘rescues’, trade creditors and the bank’s share
In the arguments in the previous Section, considerable reliance has been placed on certain of
the findings of the recent Franks-Sussman study. As argued above, the study goes a long way
to disproving crucial assumptions underlying the most important existing attacks on the
priority of secured credit, as well as some of the predictions that can be derived from them.
But the same study also highlights an aspect of the way banks operate in this jurisdiction that
might be thought to provide new ammunition to critics of security. That is what this Section
considers.
As already noted, Franks-Sussman discovered an extensive and elaborate process of
‘intensive care’ operated by all three of the banks they studied for firms that were taken to be
heading for trouble. Firms were consigned to these ‘central rescue units’ based on the bank’s
own criteria, and subject to considerable discretion in credit officers at individual branches.
They remained there for an average of seven and a half months.141 There could be one of
three outcomes of this process. The firm might be ‘turned around’ (rescued) and returned to
its bank branch. Or it could be sent to a ‘debt recovery unit’ for the initiation of a formal
insolvency procedure. Or finally, it could repay all its loans to the bank, terminate the
banking relationship, and presumably re-bank elsewhere.
The discovery which interests us now is that, while in the ‘rescue unit’ and subject to
close supervision by specialised bank officials, the troubled companies paid off, on average,
between 30-40% of their bank debt. At the same time, the debt owed to trade creditors
increased by between 10-30%.142 This was the case overall, both for firms which were
eventually rescued and ‘returned to branch’, and those which were sent to the ‘debt recovery
unit’ for formal insolvency proceedings. The picture was quite similar if the latter were
considered in isolation. For one of the banks, Franks-Sussman found that ‘the bank never
extends further loans to a company that is placed eventually in bankruptcy… although the
trade creditors do so quite often.’143 On average for this bank, bank credit shrank by almost
14% and trade credit grew by over 11% while the company was in the ‘rescue unit’. Given
that in the insolvency proceedings that followed for these companies, the bank would have
priority over trade creditors, this amounted to ‘almost a direct transfer from the trade
creditors to the bank.’ This despite the fact that, as the authors noted, ‘trade creditors are
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typically small, undiversified, and highly exposed to the risk of default. Unlike the bank, they
have no comparative advantage in bearing these risks.’144
It would not be surprising if some critics of security seized upon these results as
proof, at last, for one or other of the anti-security Hypotheses. Surely security is being used,
very simply, to siphon away value from trade creditors? The temptation to use these figures
to paint -- with a broad brush -- a picture of exploitation on part of secured creditors might
well be strong. It is submitted this temptation is best resisted if the aim is instead to acquire
an accurate picture of these figures. The first point to note is the obvious one that the
movement of funds from trade creditors to the company in the rescue unit, and from it to the
bank, as depicted in the previous paragraph, is based on averages across the client firms of
this particular bank. This is significant here because these averages hide what in fact are the
‘great variations in the record of debt repayments’ to trade creditors and the bank during the
time the firm was under bank supervision. This is obvious, for example, from a comparison
of firms arranged with reference to the amount of debt outstanding at the time of entry into
the ‘rescue unit’. For companies in the bottom quartile, 58.7% of bank debt was indeed
repaid on average. However, this figure decreases to 18.2% for those in the next quartile up.
For companies in the top quartile, bank debt actually increased by 29.1% while the firms
were under close scrutiny by bank officials.145 So the first conclusion to be drawn is that
security is not accurately regarded as merely a mechanism for appropriating value provided
to the troubled firm by trade creditors. In fact, as noted, there are very significant differences
in bank strategy in dealing with firms of different sizes.146 For larger firms, the (securityholding) bank actually injects additional value into the firm, which amounts on average to a
third of what it was originally owed.
Next, we should note that there is a fairly straight-forward correlation between the
repayment of the troubled firm’s bank debt, and the sale of assets by the firm itself. Almost
half the firms in the ‘rescue unit’ reported ‘significant asset sales in the rescue process’. In
interpreting this data, it is important to keep in mind both the priority-based nature of
security, and the fact that the ‘absolute priority rule’ (which requires senior creditors to be
paid off before junior claimants get anything) is quite firmly entrenched in this jurisdiction.
Given these factors, the finding that the firms which sold off assets usually applied most of
the proceeds to pay off their bank debt should come as no surprise.147 If any assets become
available during the rescue process, the bank as senior claimant obviously has the first right
to them. The important thing to note here is that this is merely a manifestation of the nature
of security. It is not, by itself, evidence that security is exploitative. Critics of the priority of
secured lending have to say something more than that secured creditors have priority! The
data so far mentioned supports only the latter proposition. It also shows once again that the
relationship between value provided by trade creditors and that withdrawn by the security
holder is not as clear-cut as the average figures mentioned above misleadingly suggest. Much
of the repayment of bank debt (though certainly not all) can be attributed to the sale of assets,
rather than to the appropriation of value injected by trade creditors.
The obvious question then is: why the apparent beneficence towards larger distressed
companies, and in turn towards their trade creditors, as noted above? Further analysis carried
out by Franks-Sussman provides an interesting insight. A ‘striking explanation’ for the
differences in repayment of bank debt is ‘the incidence of managerial turnover’. The data
shows that firms which owed the bank more (and were thus presumably larger) were more
likely to replace an important member of the managerial team. For such firms, the bank
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contracted its debt by a mere 1.2%. Smaller firms changed their management much more
rarely, and the bank contracted its debt to them to a far greater degree, at 28.3%.148 This is
consistent with the point made in Section 2 of this paper, that managers of smaller firms, who
also own most of the equity in it, would have huge undiversified pecuniary, and
undiversifiable non-pecuniary, investments in the firm. It simply does not make sense for
them to let go of control of the firm, since the costs to them of doing so are great. They prefer
to remain at the helm even when that increases the probability their firm would be unable to
survive a particular crisis. This should be read together with the finding that the higher the
probability that a manager would be replaced, very significantly greater is the chance that the
firm would be successfully rescued, of course to the benefit of all including trade creditors.149
All this shows that any conclusion that the bank simply uses its security to
appropriate value from trade creditors would be crude and inaccurate. In reality, the position
seems to be that the bank employs the leverage provided to it by security ‘to encourage (or
force) distressed firms to undergo restructuring, that includes downsizing and managerial
replacement. [Both these factors appear] to be significantly [and inversely] related to the size
of debt repayments demanded by bank’. They are also significantly (and positively) related to
the probability of a successful rescue.150 All the concerned parties, including trade creditors,
are much better off if their debtor recovers than if it is liquidated.151 An overwhelming
proportion of attempted rescues (around 75%) succeed without formal insolvency
proceedings.152 All this happens in the bank’s ‘rescue unit’ under close supervision by its
officials, and as noted, is made possible by the leverage provided to the bank through its
priority position. The bank’s officials of course monitor the firm in the unit and gather data
about it, then use it to encourage the firm (in general, successfully) towards a turn-around.
They use this same data, it seems, to ensure the debt owed to the bank is paid off first when
the firm is not likely to recover, even while the less-informed trade creditors continue to
pump value into the sinking firm.
It appears, then, that one of the costs of the elaborate monitoring done by the banks
of the distressed firm is the chance that if the firm does not recover, the bank would be paid
even at the expense of the firm’s trade creditors. But it should be emphasised this by itself is
not an argument against either the efficiency or indeed the fairness of the priority of security,
since no one, to this author’s knowledge, has suggested that outside monitoring of distressed
firms does not have costs. The point is that this same monitoring also seems to bring the great
benefit to all, including trade creditors, of a very significant chance of successful rescue of
the debtor. It follows that to make an argument against security, one would have to conclude
either (or both) of two things. First, one would have to show that the removal or reduction of
the priority of secured lending would not impede the secured creditor’s ability to monitor and
influence the debtor. Alternatively, it would have to be demonstrated that the benefit of an
increased chance of successful rescue associated with this monitoring is outweighed
nevertheless by whatever harm results from it in case of that minority of firms for which this
monitoring does not lead to rescue.153 Till such an argument is made (and made successfully),
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it is submitted the Franks-Sussman study cannot be used in support of either of the antisecurity Hypotheses. This suggestion is reinforced by the important fact that, as discussed
above, the study shows secured creditors (in particular, the very bank whose strategy is
discussed in this Section) seem to price their debt in a way which very clearly belies the
assumptions and predictions of them both.
But do we have to leave this debate in this rather inconclusive state? Must we wait
till data is available to decide the questions just posed, before deciding whether the priority
of secured credit is desirable, all things considered? Fortunately, we can do somewhat better.

6. Beginning the affirmative case for the priority of secured lending
The burden of the argument so far has mostly been to show what security does not do. It has
been argued it does not facilitate the exploitation of involuntary or ‘uninformed’ creditors.
Nor does it create inefficiency through its ability to transfer insolvency value from ‘nonadjusting’ to secured creditors and debtors. It would be natural at this point to ask what its
role really is. That debate seems interminable, as mentioned above. The issue will not of
course be settled here. However, this Section takes the argument further, utilising evidence
from this jurisdiction to suggest the priority of secured credit, by reducing the probability of
the debtor’s insolvency in the first place, is likely in general to be universally valueenhancing. The argument, in outline, is the following. Companies borrow on a secured basis
in two situations. There are, first, those which could borrow without offering security. These
companies have strong incentives not to offer security. They will pledge collateral only when
this significantly reduces their risk of insolvency. Other companies are faced with the choice
between either offering security, or not being able to borrow at all. This being the case,
security is almost always offered for ‘new money’. For such companies, this new money
means the difference between solvency and insolvency. All creditors, including preferential,
trade, and any ‘involuntary’ creditors, are far better off if their company survives, than if it is
liquidated insolvent. It follows that secured credit, by improving the probability of the
debtor’s survival, is value-enhancing from their perspective in both situations.154
In the first situation, then, we should begin by noting that companies in a position to
borrow on an unsecured basis have very strong incentives not to borrow secured. Evidence
(from this jurisdiction and the US) that the strongest companies very rarely (if ever) borrow
on a secured basis has already been mentioned above.155 As noted there, this fact is
universally acknowledged, including by the leading critics of security. Nor is this some
unexplained empirical anomaly. We have strong theoretical reasons for supposing firms
would rather borrow unsecured than secured. We can understand these by first asking why
firms issue secured debt. The only reason routinely mentioned is that it would allow them to
benefit from reduced interest rates. But on this basis, the healthiest firms have little incentive
to issue secured debt. This is because the reduction in interest rates that security supposedly
captured by the ‘choice position’ of the Authentic Consent Model, where a party is asked to make
decisions about appropriate rules after being deprived of the knowledge, not only of whether it would
be a trade creditor of a firm which is successfully rescued or of one which is liquidated, but even
whether it will turn out to be a trade- or employee- or bank creditor in the first place, etc.; see Mokal,
above n 2.
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brings is said to be overwhelmingly dependent on the probability of default on the loan.156
Now, the healthier the firm, the less likely it is to default. It follows that the healthier the
firm, the less appreciable will be the interest rate difference for it to borrow on a secured
basis, and the smaller the incentive for it to do so.157 Healthy firms would only borrow
secured (rather than unsecured) in order to benefit from such differences if the benefit from
doing so still outweighed the costs.
We should remember, though, that there are costs associated with secured debt, and
that these can be substantial. Three of the most important categories of such costs are
identified here. First, as emphasised above, the creditor with security has a far greater
influence on debtor behaviour than the same creditor without, and it can demand more
scrupulous compliance with loan covenants. The debtor’s managers lose their freedom of
action by issuing security, and with it, their ability to add to the variance of the firm’s returns
and thus to its shareholder value. Now there is of course a partial asymmetry in the way this
loss is viewed by the debtor’s shareholder-managers, and by all others interested in the
debtor’s undertaking. It has been noted time and again that controlling these agency costs is
value-enhancing for the latter, because lowering the variance of the firm’s returns also lowers
the chances that it will be rendered insolvent. However, the shareholder-mangers, who would
capture the upside from the additional variance, would consider the security-holder’s ability
to prevent them doing so as a reason against granting security.
Second, firms would prefer to keep unpledged collateral at their disposal till they
really are in financial distress. The reasons for this have also been touched upon above.
Distressed firms find it harder to persuade creditors to lend, since the latter perceive the high
risk of default. Given that degree of risk, even critics of security accept that ‘the interest rates
necessary to compensate [lenders on an unsecured loan would be] far above customary and
legal levels [more accurately, as already explained, above levels where the adverse selection
and moral hazard problems associated with high rates become acute]. Creditors [would not
then] charge higher rates; they [would simply] refuse to lend.’158 It follows that ‘existing
firms with unpledged security are more likely to have access to external finance to help them
trade through difficulties’ by only then offering their assets as collateral.159 In addition, firms
with growth possibilities would wish to keep free collateral in order to avoid the
‘underinvestment’ problem. They might find it difficult at a later date to finance a profitable
project using outside funds, given that if insolvency then occurs, the returns from the new
venture might go in part or fully to pay off pre-existing creditors. Being asked to subsidise
these creditors in this way puts off potential new lenders from providing funds. The ability to
attract new funding by offering later creditors a higher priority is one way of overcoming this
problem.160 In both the situations just mentioned, ‘using up’ collateral prematurely, when it
was still possible to borrow unsecured, merely to enjoy any tiny (more likely, non-existent)
interest rate benefits would make little sense, and certainly would not be a rational strategy.
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Finally, and following from the observations above that strong companies do not
often borrow on a secured basis and that any security-based interest rate differences are only
going to be important for risky firms, encumbering most of one’s assets could be a signal that
creditors do not consider this debtor a safe enough risk to lend to it unsecured.161 We have
already considered evidence above that in this jurisdiction, when creditors’ perception of the
firm’s riskiness increases, the interest rate charged on loans to it goes up, and the firm’s
shareholder-managers are often asked to provide personal guarantees. Other counter-parties
might also seek to tighten up their terms, insisting for example on trading on a cash-ondelivery basis. Once again, then, pledging the firm’s assets is unlikely to be taken lightly by
its managers, since it brings disadvantages both for them and their firm.
For all these reasons, firms able to borrow unsecured will only offer security where
there is a significant ex ante risk of managerial misbehaviour, and therefore a significant risk
of insolvency. Only then would the existence of security lower the risk of insolvent
liquidation sufficiently to cause the lender to offer a rate reduction on a secured loan large
enough to outweigh these costs. The most obvious example of the sort of firm in this position
would be one with large growth potential, whose managers might be perceived to have a
greater incentive, once the loan has been made, to engage in negative net present value
projects. Managers could use security as a bond to obtain cheaper finance.162
Moving on to the second situation where security will be deployed, there is
substantial evidence that for many of the companies borrowing secured, the choice is one
between doing so and not being able to borrow at all, not that between borrowing unsecured
on higher rates and secured on lower ones. The Bank of England has noted that ‘Ready
access to finance when needed is often a more compelling consideration for small firms than
its actual cost’, and that ‘the availability of debt finance to small firms is affected by the size
and value of those assets which can be taken as collateral’.163 A survey of its members by the
Institute of Directors found that more than half of those ‘whose plea for finance had been
dismissed by their bank attributed the bank’s decision to their lack of collateral’.164 And we
have already noted above that the Franks-Sussman study found that firms which eventually
ended up in the banks’ ‘rescue units’ had almost universally borrowed on a secured basis. In
view of the evidence discussed above, any suggestion these firms could have bargained with
their bank to borrow unsecured by offering a higher interest rate would be simply incredible.
This analysis leads us to postulate that there will come a time when some companies
wishing to gain credit will either have to offer their assets as collateral, or do without credit
altogether. Not all firms will then offer security; some would prefer to find other ways of
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raising money (e.g. through equity injections), or would go without additional funds at that
point.165 So for firms which do end up borrowing on a secured basis, the choice they would
have faced would likely have been even starker. It would have been one between offering
security or going into insolvent liquidation. The reason is easy to understand. Firms would
only borrow on a secured basis when they could not borrow unsecured, and the value to them
of new funding exceeded the costs identified above. This is only likely to be the case when
they face a serious threat to their continued survival. Only then would the opportunity cost of
having unpledged assets (held precisely so as to be available in a crisis), any reputational
costs of offering security, the costs of surrendering some freedom of action to a creditor, etc.
are likely to be outweighed by the expected costs of impending insolvency. We can speculate
about the type of company likely to find itself in this situation. Most obviously, this would be
the case for companies on the brink of or already in financial distress. It is also likely to be
the case with some start-ups which have no established track record and therefore a lesser
chance of persuading a bank of the competence of its management and (less importantly) the
viability of its business plans.166 Both types of firm are likely to be faced with a credit crunch
and a looming liquidity crisis. And there is support for the proposition that the lack of
liquidity is a leading cause of insolvency.167 Loss of long term finance, lack of working
capital and a poor cash flow have been consistently identified as among the main factors in
company failure in successive Surveys by the Association of Business Recovery
Professionals (formerly, SPI).168 And the Bank of England has noted the more direct finding
that ‘the availability of collateral does not impact on the birth of new firms, but on [their]
survival rates’.169
So firms unable to borrow without pledging collateral are likely to borrow secured
only when their survival depends on being able to find fresh funding. This should be read
together with evidence from the US that the availability of fresh funding for distressed firms
raises both the expected recovery rates for unsecured creditors, and the chances of the firm
itself being rescued successfully.170 We can now see why the availability of secured funding
is actually value-enhancing for all of the firm’s creditors. All creditors are much better off if
their debtor either (a) lowers the probability of ending up insolvent, or even more strongly,
(b) recovers from financial distress. This is dramatically brought out by considering the
following calculation.171 Let U = the expected value of unsecured claims, p = the probability
that the debtor would be liquidated insolvent, and F = the actual, full value of unsecured
claims. Suppose also that if the debtor is liquidated without secured credit ever being issued,
unsecured creditors would get a (very generous) 80 pence on the pound.172 If the debtor
becomes insolvent after having issued secured credit, unsecured claimants would
(pessimistically) get nothing.173 In either case, if the debtor survives, unsecured creditors are
paid back in full. Finally and in line with the analysis above, assume that if secured credit is
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not available when it is most likely to be used (i.e. when the debtor suffers a high risk of
ending up insolvent), the probability of the debtor being liquidated insolvent is (a relatively
low) 60%. If secured credit is then issued, it falls moderately to 40%.174 The expected value
of unsecured claims is then given by the equation:
Expected value of unsecured claims = probability of insolvent liquidation multiplied
by the return on unsecured claims in debtor’s insolvency + probability of rescue
multiplied by the return on unsecured claims if debtor is rescued.
If no secured debt is issued, the equation can be solved as follows:
U = p (0.8 x F) + (1-p) F
= 0.6 (0.8 x F) + (0.4 x F)
= 0.52 x F
On the other hand, if secured debt is issued, the outcome is:
U = p (0) + (1-p) F
= (0.4 x 0) + 0.6 x F
= 0.6 x F
So even on these very conservative figures which assume a relatively low probability
of insolvent liquidation if the high-risk firm does not borrow on a secured basis, a very
moderate decrease in this probability if secured credit is issued, and fairly extreme figures for
the return on unsecured claims, the conclusion is still that all unsecured creditors are better
off because some creditors are induced to lend by being offered priority, when they would not
lend if priority could not be offered to them. So secured credit enhances the expected value of
all claims (preferential, trade, involuntary, ‘uninformed’, ‘non-adjusting’, etc.) by reducing
the risk of the debtor’s insolvency.
It should also be pointed out that this argument does not depend at all on many of the
‘traditional’ justifications of security, e.g., that it is fair from the point of view of unsecured
creditors because they would have notice of its existence, or that the law should not restrict
the property rights of debtors in their assets or the freedom of contract of debtors and
potential secured creditors.175 Nothing in this argument turns on taking any position on these
issues.
There is however one other possibility which has not yet been considered. Suppose
the debtor has no secured debt, and gets into difficulties. Its main bank demands security, not
by offering it more credit (or sufficient credit to bring about an improvement in the debtor’s
chances of survival we stipulate to be ‘appropriate’), but by threatening to send it into
liquidation straightaway if security is not given for debt already outstanding. It would be very
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surprising if this never happens in the real world today.176 This is the point where the analysis
in this Section ties into the suggestions made at the end of the previous one. It is in the
situation now being considered that the only benefit (if any) to the debtor’s unsecured
creditors comes from the increased ability of the bank to monitor and influence the debtor,
thereby improving the latter’s chances of recovery. So the two questions given at the end of
the last Section are relevant only to that sub-set of situations where security is given for no
(or insufficient) new value.
However, we should note the following point. Even if it were concluded, in this
situation, that the expected costs to unsecured creditors of being deferred to secured creditors
in their debtor’s insolvency are greater than the expected benefits of the improved chances of
avoiding insolvency flowing from the increased control of debtor behaviour alone (as
explained in the previous Section), this still would not by itself be an argument for restricting
the priority of secured lending. We would then have reason to suppose priority was being
demanded by one creditor here simply to improve its own position at the expense of others, in
other words, to secure a preference for itself. But then, this ought to be dealt with just like
any other attempt to engineer such a preference. So we would have an argument for
strengthening the legal provisions against voidable preferences (and perhaps those against
transactions at an undervalue), so as to bar the offering of security except for appropriate new
value. In effect, there would then be a good reason for reconsidering -- and perhaps reversing
-- either or both parts of the decision in Re MC Bacon Ltd. (No. 1).177 An obvious reform
would be to extend in an appropriate way the effect of section 245 of the Insolvency Act,
which invalidates floating charges granted for ‘past value’, to cover fixed charges as well. It
seems to this author that any more general tampering with the priority of secured credit needs
stronger justification than is currently available.

7. Conclusion
This paper has examined the main attacks on the institution of secured credit, and in
particular, on the priority of secured lending. It identified the main parties that are alleged to
be harmed by the existence of that priority. The supposed exploitation of involuntary
(especially tort) creditors was the obvious starting point. It was argued that the possibility of
such exploitation is very remote. For large firms which have the ability to acquire significant
involuntary credit (for example by inflicting tortious harm), there is evidence that little or no
secured debt is issued, and such involuntary creditors are paid off to a significant degree. For
smaller firms which do issue security, the alleged benefit of reduction in interest rates
obtained by doing so is likely to be greatly outweighed by the costs of liquidation to their
shareholder-managers. A ‘representative’ numerical example was discussed in order to bring
out the implausibility of the Exploitation Hypothesis. Empirical data was also examined to
test the predictions of the Hypothesis, each one of which it seems to contradict.
Attention was also given to the claim that security creates a subsidy extracted by
coalitions of debtors and secured creditors from ‘uninformed’ or ‘ill-equipped’ or
‘unsophisticated’ creditors who systematically underestimate the risk associated with their
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loans and therefore under-price them. Such arguments seem to pay insufficient attention to
the purging effects of the market, which encourage creditors either to learn how to price
loans properly, or be driven out of business. The startling implications of the suggestion that
naturally ‘unsophisticated’ creditors be ‘protected’ from the effects of the priority of secured
credit were also brought out and examined.
The claims that the existence of ‘non-adjusting’ creditors leads to several types of
inefficiency, mainly to do with the monitoring implications of substituting the protection it
offers in place of the extraction and enforcement of non-security covenants, were also
investigated. It was suggested that empirical evidence from this jurisdiction casts doubt both
on the assumptions on which these arguments (and the others noted above) are based, and on
the predictions that can be extracted from them. Most notably, the assumptions that it is up to
the debtor to offer security, and that if it does, the interest rate it is charged would go down
while the insolvency costs of its shareholder-managers remain unaffected, all are found to be
false. The basic prediction of the anti-security Hypotheses that there would either be no
significant relationship, or a direct one, between the proportion of the total estate derived
from value provided by the secured creditor and the interest rate it charges, is also strongly
belied by the evidence available. In this context, the informal ‘intensive care’ provided by
banks (generally as secured creditors) to distressed firms was also examined.
In view of all these arguments and data, we can conclude, as did Schwartz in the US,
that in this jurisdiction too, ‘the case for restricting the secured debt priority in bankruptcy
has yet to be made.’178 The argument in this paper concluded with a demonstration that the
priority of secured credit is likely to be value-enhancing for all unsecured creditors. To the
extent that this last point holds, unsecured creditors have every reason to wish not to be
‘saved’ from secured ones!
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